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1VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC LUCK, REVISITED
DUNCAN PRITCHARD
ABSTRACT. In this paper I return to an argument that I presented in earlier work to the effect that
virtue epistemology is at worse false and at best unmotivated. In the light of recent responses to this
argument from such figures as John Greco, Guy Axtell, and Kelly Becker, I here re-state and re-
evaluate this argument. In the process the original argument is refined and supplemented in key
respects and some of the main charges against it are shown to be unfounded. Nevertheless, I also
argue that at least one of the objections to the original argumentdue to Beckermay well be on the
right lines, and draw some conclusions in this regard.
KEYWORDS: Epistemology; Luck; Reliabilism; Virtue.
0. INTRODUCTION
In recent worksee especially Pritchard (2003; 2005a, chapter 6)I have argued for a
provocative claim regarding the status of virtue epistemology. In short, it goes as follows:
virtue epistemology is at worst false and at best unmotivated, and that reflecting on the
phenomenon of epistemic luck highlights this fact to us. The arguments I put forward in
defence of this claim have received quite a lot attention (more than I expected at any rate),
and this has prompted me to think again about the argument. In particular, some of the
objections put forward have made me realise that the argument could have been presented in
a cleaner fashion to avoid confusion. Moreover, at least one of the objections has made me
wonder whether the original contention was right, or at least as secure as I thought. With this
in mind, I here re-state the original argument in what is, I hope, a better form, and examine in
detail the various objections raised against it.
Before I turn to the argument itself, however, I want to make some clarificatory
remarks regarding the target of my argument to save possible confusion later on. My focus is
virtue epistemology regarding knowledge, which I take to be any view which holds that
knowledge must be defined in terms of the epistemic virtues and cognitive faculties. We can
distinguish a strong and a weak version of the virtue-theoretic thesis in this regard. The
former claims that knowledge must be essentially and exclusively understood in terms of the
epistemic virtues and cognitive faculties, whilst the weak version claims merely that
knowledge must be essentially understood in terms of the epistemic virtues and cognitive
2faculties, though perhaps not exclusively so. My argument against virtue epistemology is that
strong virtue epistemology is false, and that weak virtue epistemology, while perhaps true, is
as it stands undermotivated, or at least not motivated to the extent that proponents of the view
typically suppose.
Implicit in this argument is the thought that if virtue epistemology is understood in
any way weaker than the weak reading just offered, then it is of little interest (at least when it
comes to the task of defining knowledge). If, for example, the claim is just that knowledge
can be usefully understood in, in part at least, virtue-theoretic terms, although there are
alternative and equally adequate ways available, then I don’t think the view is all that
distinctive. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that in this sense the view becomes almost
entirely uncontroversial.
Of course, one might argue that the virtue epistemological project is about so much
more than simply offering a definition of knowledge, and has explored and cast light on
issues that other epistemological proposals have tended to disregard. This is certainly correct,
and three clear examples which illustrate this point spring to mind. The first is that the virtue
epistemological movement has inevitably brought about a rapprochement between
epistemology and ethics, prompting a new wave of cross-fertilisation between these two
cores areas of philosophy. The second is pretty much a consequence of the first, in that that
the distinctive contribution that those working on virtue epistemology have made to the issue
of epistemic value is almost certainly a product of the fact that axiological issues lie at the
heart of virtue theory. Finally, the third example concerns how virtue epistemology has
usefully shifted part of the focus of epistemological theorising away from the minimal
conditions for knowledgea focus that was prompted by the almost interminable post-
Gettier literatureand towards higher-order epistemic standings, like understanding and
wisdom.
I wouldn’t want to dispute that the effect of virtue epistemology on contemporary
epistemological debate in each of these three cases (and others) has been undoubtedly a good
thing. That said, however, it remains that the appeal of virtue epistemology is very much
limited unless it can contribute to the issue of how to define knowledge, and that issue is my
concern here.
One final point of clarification that I would like to make is that I am not denying that
explaining how creatures such as us come to have knowledge is often best understood along
virtue-theoretic linesindeed, I think that this is the right way to go. My worry just concerns
3the supposed need to define knowledge in virtue-theoretic terms, which I take to be the
characteristic claim of virtue epistemology (if merely saying that we typically acquire
knowledge through the operation of one’s epistemic virtues and cognitive faculties makes
you a virtue epistemologist, then I suspect we are all virtue epistemologists).
With these clarificatory points in mind, we can turn to the argument itself.
1. THE BASIC ARGUMENT APPLIED TO AGENT RELIABILISM
A key motivation for virtue epistemology is its apparent ability to deal with epistemic luck in
a more satisfactory way than other views. One can see the prima facie attraction of this way
of motivating the virtue-theoretic thesis. We all agree, after all, that knowledge is non-lucky
true belief, since you can’t gain knowledge by luck (think, for example, of the Gettier cases
in this regard). One natural explanation of this fact is that knowledge is a kind of
achievement, and genuine achievements are not due to luck. Instead, the achievement has to
be properly attributable to the agent herself. Hitting the target with one’s arrow by luck is of
no credit to you; whereas hitting the target through skill is. The latter is a case of success
which is attributable to the agent, while the former is not. Knowledge is like hitting the target
through skill rather than luck: it is success (i.e., true belief) which is properly attributable to
the agent rather than being due to luck.
The import of this line of thought to virtue epistemology is that by defining
knowledge in terms of the epistemic virtues and cognitive faculties, such views make the
cognitive character of the agent a central part of what it is to know. Accordingly, or so the
thought runs, virtue epistemologies are in a peculiarly good position to account for what
knowledge is because they are in a peculiarly good position to accommodate the idea that
knowledge is a cognitive success that is properly attributable to the agent rather than due to
luck.
One finds this sort of motivation for virtue epistemology throughout the literature, and
if it works then it is indeed an excellent way of motivating the thesis. Perhaps the clearest
statement of this way of motivating the virtue-theoretic thesis can be found in the work of
John Greco (e.g., 1999) who uses it to motivate a reliabilism-based version of virtue
epistemology that he calls agent reliabilism.1 This view holds that knowledge requires a true
belief that is formed through the agent’s stable and reliable character traits (i.e., epistemic
virtues and cognitive faculties) that make up that agent’s “cognitive character”. In what
4follows I will specifically focus on this reliabilist version of virtue epistemology, taking
Greco’s agent reliabilism to be representative of reliabilism-based epistemology more
generally.2 Later on, we’ll see how the argument I offer against virtue epistemology fares
against a representative non-reliabilism-based virtue epistemology.
Greco’s discussion of epistemic luck focuses on certain standard counterexamples that
are often offered against more basic non-virtue-theoretic forms of reliabilism, such as process
reliabilism, where these counterexamples are precisely cases in which an agent forms her
reliable true belief via luck and hence can’t plausibly be thought of as a knower. For example,
consider an agent who is forming a belief about what the temperature of the room is by
looking at a malfunctioning thermometer, the reading on which is randomly fluctuating
within a certain temperature band. Suppose further, however, that this way of forming beliefs
about the temperature of the room is entirely reliable because, as it happens, there is someone
hidden in the rooma ‘helper’who controls the temperature of the room and who ensures
that every time our protagonist goes to check the thermometer, the reading it gives is correct.3
The agent in this case thus has true beliefs and, in one sense at least, her beliefs are
also reliably formed. Clearly, however, these beliefs do not amount to knowledge, and the
explanation that Greco offers for why agents lack knowledge in cases like this is that they do
not get to the truth via their cognitive characters, but rather due to luck (in this case, the luck
that the environment is such that there is someone who is ensuring that the agent’s beliefs are
true even despite being formed by looking at a broken thermometer). That is, such beliefs are
epistemically lucky, and hence not knowledge, and thus virtue epistemologyin this case in
the guise of Greco’s agent reliabilismis needed to rectify the situation.
Agent reliabilism will certainly handle this case because it is uncontentious that the
agent concerned is not forming a true belief via her cognitive character, since the true belief
is the result of the helper’s intervention. And what goes for the thermometer case is meant to
go for others like it where the reliability in question is not knowledge-conducive because it
allows an undue degree of epistemic luck, in the sense that the truth of the agent’s belief is
not due to the agent but rather due to some feature external to the agent.
I don’t dispute that virtue epistemology can handle cases of this sort in this way; my
concern is rather that such views are unable to deal with all cases of epistemic luck in this
fashion. In order to see this, one only needs to note that virtue epistemologists will typically
grant that they are unable to deal with (at least some) Gettier cases. Here is a scenario
described by Linda Zagzebski that will serve our purposes:4
5Suppose that Mary has good eyesight, but it is not perfect. It is good enough to allow her to
identify her husband sitting in his usual chair in the living room from a distance of fifteen feet in
somewhat dim light [...] Of course, her faculties may not be functioning perfectly, but they are
functioning well enough that if she goes on to form the belief My husband is sitting in the living
room, her belief has enough warrant to constitute knowledge when true and we can assume that it
is almost always true [...] Suppose Mary simply misidentifies the chair sitter, who is, we’ll
suppose, her husband’s brother, who looks very much like him [...] We can now easily amend the
case as a Gettier example. Mary’s husband could be sitting on the other side of the room, unseen
by her. (Zagzebski 1996, 285-7, emphasis in the original)
Although he later retracted this concessionsomething which we will discuss further
belowGreco originally conceded that agent reliabilism is unable to deal with cases like this
(see, for example, Greco 2000, 251). After all, the agent in this case is indeed forming her
true belief via the operation of the reliable cognitive traits that make up her cognitive
character. And yet, because of the distinctive twist that is always involved in Gettier cases,
her true belief is not a case of knowledge because it is manifestly substantively due to
epistemic luck.
We have, then, a puzzle, in that one primary motivation for virtue epistemology is its
ability to offer an account of knowledge that is not susceptible to epistemic luck in the way
that other accounts (like process reliabilism) are, and yet virtue epistemologists typically
concede that perhaps the most standard concern about epistemic luck in the literature
(scepticism aside)i.e., the epistemic luck at issue in Gettier casescannot be dealt with by
their view.
On the face of it, this might not seem like such a problem since, after all, most theories
of knowledge have problems dealing with Gettier cases, just as most theories of knowledge
have problems dealing with radical scepticism. Such a situation is not comfortable for the
virtue epistemologist, however, because it entails that a strong version of virtue
epistemologyi.e., one that defines knowledge exclusively in terms of the epistemic virtues
and cognitive facultiesis unavailable.
Moreover, the dialectical situation is in fact even worse than this, in that the sort of
epistemic condition that one needs to add to one’s view in order to deal with the problem of
epistemic luck posed by the Gettier cases will in fact also deal with the other kinds of cases of
epistemic luck that virtue epistemology is meant to eradicate. Accordingly, this condition
does all the work of virtue epistemology in this regard, and more.
In order to see this, consider the fact that the kind of epistemic luck at issue in the
Gettier casesand, indeed, in the other sorts of cases that the virtue epistemologist focuses
6onis targeted at the truth of the belief in questioni.e., it is a matter of luck that the belief
is true, given the way the case is described. I have argued elsewhere that we can gloss what it
means for an event to be lucky as follows: an event is lucky if it obtains in the actual world
but not in a wide class of near-by possible worlds where the relevant initial conditions for that
event are the same as in the actual world.5 So, for example, a lottery win is a paradigmatic
lucky event because while one wins in the actual world, in most near-by possible worlds
where the relevant initial conditions for that event are the same as in the actual world (where
one continues to play, for example, and the lottery continues to be free and fair) one loses.
Applied to the kind of epistemic luck that we are interested in, this account of luck gives us
the following gloss on what it means for the truth of a belief to be lucky: the truth of a belief
is lucky if that belief is true in the actual world but false in a wide class of near-by possible
worlds in which the relevant initial conditions for the formation of that belief are the same as
in the actual world (i.e., where one forms one’s belief in the target proposition in the same
way as in the actual world).6
This account of epistemic luck is very vague of courseI supply more detail
elsewhere, such as in Pritchard (2005a, part two)but it will do for our purposes here, for
note that it captures very neatly the kind of epistemic luck at issue in both the Gettier cases
and the cases of epistemic luck that Greco was concerned to eradicate with his agent
reliabilism, such as the thermometer case. In the Gettier case described above, for example,
the agent truly believes in the actual world that her husband is in the sitting room even
though, in a wide class of near-by possible worlds where she forms her belief in the same
way as in the actual world (by looking across at what appears to be her husband in his chair)
her belief will be false. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the thermometer case. Although
the agent happens to form a true belief in the actual world, in a wide class of near-by possible
worlds where she forms her belief in the same way as in the actual world (i.e., by looking at
the broken thermometer) her belief will be false because the helper won’t be interceding on
her behalf to ensure that her belief is true.
There is a fairly straightforward way of dealing with epistemic luck of this sortwhat
I have elsewhere called, following Mylan Engal (1992), “veritic” luckwhich is to simply
stipulate that one’s true belief should not be veritically luckyi.e., should not be such that in
a wide class of relevant near-by possible worlds the belief in question is false; or,
alternatively, should be such that the belief continues to be true in most relevant near-by
worlds. The observant reader will have spotted right away that such an anti-luck condition is
7essentially a version of the safety condition, as defended by Ernest Sosa (1999) and others.
This is not surprising, since the whole point of safety has always been to capture the idea that
knowledge involves having a true belief that could not have easily been wrong, and an
obvious modal gloss of this claim is preciously that which we just gave as our anti-veritic
luck condition.
The trouble is, of course, that an anti-veritic luck condition, like safety, will itself
suffice to deal with the sorts of cases of epistemic lucksuch as the thermometer casethat
the virtue epistemologist cites in order to motivate her view. Moreover, it seems that virtue
epistemologists will themselves have to cite a condition of this general sort in order to
respond to the Gettier problem anyway, and often do. But if safety is to be part of the view
anyway, then why is there any need to appeal to the specific virtue-theoretic aspects of the
position in order to deal with other cases of epistemic luck that are neutralised by this anti-
luck condition? That is, why not simply opt for a safety-based theory of knowledge and make
no essential reference, in one’s definition of knowledge at any rate, to the epistemic virtues
and cognitive faculties?
Here, then, is the rub, as far as the virtue epistemologist is concerned. Given that one
can deal with this kind of epistemic luck by appeal to a condition of this sortand given that,
furthermore, virtue epistemologists will themselves have to appeal to a condition of this sort
anyway in order to deal with the Gettier problem, a condition which, note, is not in any
obvious way in the spirit of virtue epistemologythen how can consideration of (non-
Gettier) cases of veritic luck offer any direct support for virtue epistemology? Indeed, don’t
such cases motivate, if anything, an anti-luck epistemology defined in terms of some sort of
safety condition, rather than an account of knowledge defined exclusively in terms of the
epistemic virtues and cognitive faculties? I conclude that one central plank of support for
virtue epistemology is in fact, on closer inspection, offering very little support at all.
2. GRECO’S DEFENCE OF AGENT RELIABILISM
As we will see in a moment, we need to complicate this critical line in order to deal with non-
reliabilism-based virtue epistemologies, and Zagzebski’s non-reliabilism-based virtue
epistemology in particular. Before we get on to that issue, however, I want to consider the
response that has been offered by Greco (2003; forthcoming) to this line of argument.
8Greco offers two points in response to my argument. The first is to propose a virtue-
theoretic response to the Gettier problem, something which he hasn’t tried to do previously. I
will deal with this suggestion in the next section. The second, which I will focus on here, is to
argue that safety-based theories of knowledge are fatally flawed.7
Essentially, Greco’s claim in this regard is that safety is ambiguous in a crucial
respect, and that either way one irons out the ambiguity, one is left with a condition that
cannot accommodate key cases. In particular, Greco (2003, 263) argues that safety can be
read as either weak or strong safety:
Weak Safety
For all S, ϕ, S’s belief in a contingent proposition, ϕ, is weakly safe iff in most near-by possible
worlds in which S forms the belief that ϕ in the same way as in the actual world, S’s belief is true.
Strong Safety
For all S, ϕ, S’s belief in a contingent proposition, ϕ, is weakly safe iff in all near-by possible worlds
in which S forms the belief that ϕ in the same way as in the actual world, S’s belief is true.
The problem with the weak reading of safety, argues Greco, is that it isn’t strong enoughit
leaves cases of epistemic luck uneliminated that we want eliminated by our theory of
knowledge. In contrast, the problem with the strong reading of safety is that it’s too
strongit is inconsistent with cases of knowledge that intuitively we want our theory of
knowledge to be consistent with.
Greco illustrates the first horn of this dilemma with the lottery case:
S buys a ticket for a lottery in which the chances of winning are ten million to one. A few minutes
later, reasoning on the basis of past experience and relevant background knowledge, S forms the
true belief that she will lose the lottery. Of course her grounds for so believing are merely
inductive: it is possible that she buys the winning ticket, although this is extremely unlikely.
Greco (forthcoming, 1-2; cf. Greco 2003, 266)
Most would agree that agents lack knowledge in the lottery case, and that knowledge is
lacked because it is in a sense lucky that the agent’s belief is true if it is true. Greco’s claim,
however, is that using weak safety will force you to grant knowledge to the agent in this case,
contrary to intuition. I think Greco is right about this, which is why I reject the weak safety
reading of safety.
So if I had to choose between the two readings of safety, then I would opt for the
strong reading. Greco thinks that cases like the rubbish chute example show why this reading
of safety is unsustainable:
On the way to the elevator S drops a trash bag down the garbage chute of her apartment building.
9A few minutes later, reasoning on the basis of past experience and relevant background
knowledge, S forms the true belief that the bag is in the basement garbage room. Of course her
grounds for so believing are merely inductive: it is possible that the trash bag somehow gets hung
up in the chute, although this is extremely unlikely. Greco (forthcoming, 2; cf. Greco 2003, 265-6)
Greco’s point about such cases is that we intuitively think that the agent involved does have
knowledge, and yet if knowledge demands, in line with strong safety, that one’s belief match
the fact in all relevant near-by possible worlds, then this doesn’t seem to be possible. After
all, surely there are quite a few near-by possible worlds in which the garbage doesn’t make it
to the basement and yet the agent concerned continues to believe that it does (and on the
same basis as in the actual world).
I agree with Greco that there is a prima facie problem here, though I think it
disappears on closer analysis. Even if we are restricted to choosing between strong and weak
safetyand I don’t think we are, as we will see in a momentwe can still evade this
difficulty by being clear about the details of the rubbish chute example and opting for strong
safety. This is because if it is indeed unlikely that the bag will snag in this caseand note
that this will need to be the situation if the intuition that the agent has knowledge is to
holdthen it isn’t at all clear that there will be a near-by possible world in which the bag
snags and so the agent knows even by the lights of strong safety. In contrast, if we suppose
that there is a near-by possible world where the bag snagssuch that, for example, there is
something in the chute that the bag is nearly snagging on each time it fallsthen I think the
intuition that the agent has knowledge in this case would subside. So provided that we are
clear about the details of the example, then strong safety will predict the right result.
That said, I don’t think that we need to choose between strong and weak safety
anyway, since filling-out the detail of what an anti-luck epistemology looks like highlights
that the right way to formulate safety is in fact somewhere intermediate between these two
principles. In order to see this, notice that some events are luckier than others. For example,
that I nearly got hit by an accidentally fired bullet that whizzed past my ear is luckier than
nearly being hit by a bullet that (with everything else kept fixed) flew by a few feet away. We
can accommodate this difference in terms of our account of luck by noting that the range of
near-by worlds in which the lucky event (of not being hit by the bullet) fails to obtainwhere
I get hitwill be greater the luckier the event in question (i.e., greater in the first case than in
the second).
With this general point about luck in mind, think again about how best to understand
the anti-veritic luck condition on knowledge. I want to suggest that the force of the lottery
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example is not to make us see that we need to opt for strong safetyi.e., opt for a view which
does not allow any relevant near-by possible worlds in which the agent has a false belief in
the target proposition. Rather, the import of this case is only this: that there had better not be
any very close relevant near-by possible worlds in which the agent has a false belief in the
target proposition. After all, the whole point of lottery cases is that the world in which one
wins the lottery is just like the actual world, in that hardly anything needs to alter in order to
ensure one’s success. When it comes to very close relevant near-by possible worlds, that is, I
think we are naturally intolerant of any degree of epistemic luck.
Our tolerance increases, however, as we move out into non-very close near-by
possible worlds. In particular, with reference to the garbage chute case, suppose that Greco is
right that there is some way of reading this example so that there are a few relevant near-by
possible worlds in which the bag doesn’t make it to the basement and so the agent believes
falsely. Given what I said above, such worlds are bound to not be very close worlds, since
otherwise the intuition behind the examplethat this is a clear case of knowledgewould
disappear. Granted this point, however, I think we may well tolerate counterfactual error of
this sort.
We thus get an intermediate formulation of safety that evades the problem Greco
proposes while staying within the spirit of an anti-luck epistemology:
Intermediate Safety
For all S, ϕ, S’s belief in a contingent proposition, ϕ, is intermediately safe iff (i) in all very close
near-by possible worlds in which S forms the belief that ϕ in the same way as in the actual world, S’s
belief is true; and (ii) in most other near-by possible worlds in which S forms the belief that ϕ in the
same way as in the actual world, S’s belief is true.8
With Greco’s objection to safety-based theories of knowledge neutralised, there is very little
left of this aspect of his response to my argument against virtue epistemology. Everything
therefore rests on the other aspect of his argumentthe claim that there is a virtue-theoretic
response available to the Gettier cases after all.
3. THE VIRTUE-THEORETIC RESPONSE TO GETTIER CASES
Greco is not the first virtue epistemologist to try to offer a virtue-theoretic response to Gettier
cases, since Zagzebski, whose view we shall look at in a little more detail in a moment, has
also attempted to do this (see, e.g., Zagzebski 1996, §3.2; 1999, §5.B). Moreover, they both
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aim to resolve the Gettier problem in the same deceptively simple way. Here is the idea: in
gaining knowledge what is demanded is not merely that one acquired a belief through one’s
epistemic virtues and cognitive faculties which was true, but rather that one acquired a belief
which is true because it was formed through one’s epistemic virtues and cognitive faculties.
On the face of it, this would seem to do the trick. Think, for example, of the Gettier
case for standard virtue epistemologies that we saw Zagzebski offering above in which the
agent, Mary, is observing her husband’s brother across the room and truly believing, on this
basis, that her husband is in the room. In this case, while Mary is indeed virtuously forming a
true belief, the belief is not true because of anything to do with the cognitive character of
Mary, since the truth of the belief is instead due to the happenstance that her husband is in the
room hidden from view behind his brother.
Although superficially appealing, on closer inspection this proposal starts to unravel.
Consider a counterpart to Mary, Mary*, who is in exactly the same situation as Mary except
that her true belief has not been Gettiered and hence she has knowledge of what she believes.
Suppose, for example, that the husband and his brother have swapped places so that Mary* is
indeed looking at her husband. Given that all that is different about the two cases are
incidental features of the environment, it is hard to see why there should be any difference in
the cognitive characters of Mary and Mary*. But if there is no difference, then how can it be
that the truth of Mary*’s belief, but not Mary’s, is due to her cognitive character?9
Interestingly, this proposal fares even worse when it comes to other Gettier-style
examples. Consider the barn façade case in which we have an agent, let’s call him Barny,
who forms his belief that he is looking at a barn by looking (face on) at a genuine barn. The
twist in the tale, however, is that Barny is in Barn Façade County, where most of the barns
are in fact barn façades. Intuitively, Barny does not know that what he is looking at is a barn,
even though he has a justified true belief in this respect and, what is more, a true belief which
is the product of his reliable cognitive character. Whereas Mary’s belief is Gettiered in the
sense that she forms a true belief in a way that is causally disconnected with the relevant fact
(i.e., it is not the sight of her husband which gives rise to her true belief), this is not the case
for Barny’s belief since he formed it in the right way by looking at a genuine barn. Given this
feature of the case, however, then it seems that Greco’s way of dealing with Gettier cases
faces a dilemma. Either he allows that Barny does indeed have knowledge in this case, on the
grounds that his belief is true because it is formed via his reliable cognitive character, in
which case he needs to find a way of accommodating our strong intuition that Barny lacks
knowledge. This is easier said than done given that Barny’s belief is clearly veritically
12
lucky.10 Alternatively, Greco needs to argue that Barny lacks knowledge, but that this is
consistent with the proposal that he is putting forward. He might contend, for example, that
Barny’s ability to reliably detect barns just by looking at them face on is indexed to suitable
environments such that in an epistemically unfriendly environment like this one he is no
longer to be regarded as reliably forming his true belief.11 This sort of refinement to the view
looks ad hoc to me, but this is not the place to explore this objection furtherit suffices to
note that Greco has a lot of work to do to make his view plausible.
I think the moral to be drawn from these problems facing Greco’s proposal is that we
need to be given much more information about how we are to understand this ‘because of’
relation that is in play here. Interestingly, one natural way to understand Greco’s proposal in
this regard is as imposing some sort of sensitivity condition on knowledge. That is,
knowledge results in cases where the agent has a true belief that is formed as a result of a
reliable epistemic virtue which also meets the counterfactual condition that the true belief is
sensitive to the truthi.e., if the proposition believed had not been true, then the agent would
not have believed it in the way that she actually did (i.e., in this case via her cognitive
faculties).12 So in both the Gettier cases just considered, for example, the target true belief,
while formed via a cognitive faculty, is not a case of a true belief which is true because it was
formed via a cognitive faculty because, had the proposition believed not been true, then
Mary/Barny would still have believed it in the way that she/he actually did. That is, in the
nearest possible world in which her husband is not in the room, Mary would continue to
believe that he is there (because his brother would still be there), and on the same basis as in
the actual world. And in the nearest possible world in which Barny is looking at a barn
façade, he would continue to believe, on the same basis as in the actual world, that he is
looking at a barn.
Sensitivity will certainly do the trick in this regard, as indeed, would an appeal to
safety, since both of them eliminate the veritic luck involved in Gettier cases.13 Notice,
however, that if Greco does end up appealing to sensitivity or something like it here then this
leaves his position open to precisely the same objection that I levelled against strong virtue
epistemology above. In particular, since sensitivity (like safety) is not obviously a virtue-
theoretic condition, the fact that virtue epistemologists need to appeal to such a condition in
order to deal with Gettier cases indicates that the project of defining knowledge essentially
and exclusively in terms of the epistemic virtues is a failure. Moreover, note that it is as a
result of reflecting on the need to eliminate epistemic luck that this problem for virtue
13
epistemology is highlighted (as opposed to such reflection providing support for the view).14
4. ZAGZEBSKI’S NON-RELIABILISM-BASED VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY
Other responses to my argumentin particular, that offered by Guy Axtell (2003;
forthcoming)15have focused not on its application to reliabilism-based virtue epistemology,
bur rather on its application to explicitly non-reliabilism-based virtue epistemologies, and
Zagzebski’s (1996) view in particular. Axtell’s papers are rich, and I cannot hope to do
justice to all the points that he raises here. Instead, I will offer two general points which deal
with some of his key objections. I will then offer an outline of the position held by Zagzebski
that Axtell is concerned with, and show how my argument against virtue epistemology
applies to this view, before returning to make two final observations about Axtell’s critique.
To begin with, part of Axtell’s critique of my argument seems to proceed by claiming
that I fail to recognise the full scope and ambition of non-reliabilist virtue epistemic
proposals. Axtell (2003), for example, makes much of the fact that Zagzebski motivates her
virtue epistemology by considering the issue of epistemic value, the point being, presumably,
that by focussing on the virtue theoretic analysis of knowledge, particularly in the light of the
problem of epistemic luck, I fail to recognise this fact.
As I noted above, however, I do not deny that many positive things have come out of
the virtue theoretic programme in epistemology, and their contribution to the debate about
epistemic value is one of them. Moreover, such positive outcomes of the programme
obviously do lend the programme some support. Nevertheless, the point remains that unless
virtue epistemology is able to offer an analysis of knowledge which is in the spirit of the
view, then the epistemological import of the programme is severely limited. Thus, it is
essential that virtue epistemologists find a way of responding to my argument.
This brings me to a second aspect of Axtell’s critique, which is his claim that I have
failed to recognise that virtue epistemologists are not particularly interested in the project of
defining knowledge. I’m not sure what to make of this point. It is certainly true, as I have
noted, that virtue epistemologists are not solely concerned with the project of defining
knowledge, and that this is to be applauded. Moreover, there are of course important
metaphilosophical issues that are relevant here regarding what a definition of a philosophical
notion should look like. Nevertheless, I would argue that a fully-fledged proposal in
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epistemology must be able to say something substantive in this respect if it is to be accepted,
and its appeal is severely limited if it cannot do this.
Interestingly, in more recent workespecially Axtell (forthcoming)the suggestion
seems to not merely be that I have ignored the fact that virtue epistemologists do not
exclusively focus on the project of offering an informative and non-circular analysis of
knowledge, but rather that I have failed to recognise that virtue epistemology, properly
conceived, is not engaged in that project at all, even as a secondary part of the programme.
This stronger claim again raises some important metaphilosophical issues about what
the role of philosophy is; issues that I cannot engage with fully here. I am inclined to think,
however, that Axtell is overstating his stance since, given that he later goes on in this paper to
himself offer an informative and non-circular analysis of knowledge (see §5), he obviously
does not think that virtue epistemology should disengage with the project of analysis entirely.
Instead, as far as I can tell, the point is rather to treat the details of the analysis to be spelt-out
within specific contexts, rather than regarding them as fixed in advance. This sort of appeal to
context raises a dilemma for Axtell, however.
To begin with, notice that an anti-luck condition could also be regarded as only spelt-
out relative to a specific context, at least on one plausible reading of what constitutes a
context. The particular way in which a belief is safe is, after all, dependent upon a myriad of
contextual factors which go beyond purely psychological facts about the agent. Accordingly,
if Axtell just has this kind of context-sensitivity in mind, then there is no challenge here that I
should be worried about. If, on the other hand, he has a more robust sense of context-
sensitivity in mind, then I think we need to be given much more detail about how it should be
understood. Moreover, it is worth noting that such a robust account of context-sensitivity
would have the implausible result of wedding virtue epistemology to a further, and rather
contentious, epistemological thesis, one that does not obviously seem to be directly related to
the main thrust of virtue theoretic programme in epistemology. Either way, this is not a happy
result for Axtell’s critique.
With these two points in mind, I will now briefly reiterate what I say about the kind of
non-reliabilist virtue epistemologies that Axtell is concerned with, taking Zagzebski’s view to
be representative of the kind.
What is distinctive about Zagzebski’s position, in contrast to the kind of reliabilism-
based views defended by Greco and others, is that it is a form of epistemic internalism. By
epistemic internalism, I mean any view which demands of a knower that she has good
reflectively accessible grounds in favour of her belief, with epistemic externalism being any
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view which does not make this demand.16 Zagzebski’s commitment to epistemic internalism
in this sense comes out at a number of junctures in her work, but perhaps the best way to
highlight her stance in this regard is by considering how she responds to the chicken-sexer
case.
The case of the chicken-sexer concerns someone who (so the story goes) reliably
forms her beliefs about the sex of the chicks before her because of her sense of smell. As the
story is usually told, however, it’s also the case that this agent has false beliefs about how she
is doing what she is doingshe thinks she’s touching something distinctive, for example,
even though there is nothing distinctive for her to touchand that she lacks good reasons for
thinking that she is reliable in this regard (perhaps she believes that she is reliable, truly as it
happens, as a result of wishful thinking). Can such an agent know the sex of the chicks before
her?
Characteristically, epistemic externalists say ‘yes’ to this question, as do virtue
epistemologists who adopt a reliabilism-based version of the view, as Zagzebski rightly
notes. After all, the agent’s beliefs are being formed in a reliable fashion. Moreover, she is
forming true beliefs as a result of her cognitive character, since her chicken-sexing faculty is
surely part of her cognitive character. It is thus reliable true belief that arises out of a virtuous
cognitive character. Furthermore, it hasn’t been Gettiered, so there is no difficulty from that
direction. Accordingly, on this view at least, it is hard to see what could prevent the belief
from counting as an instance of knowledge.
In contrast, Zagzebski, in common with most epistemic internalists, argues that the
chicken-sexer lacks knowledge. Where externalist versions of virtue epistemology go wrong,
as far as Zagzebski is concerned, is by allowing that an agent might gain knowledge simply
via her cognitive faculties. In contrast, she maintains that knowledge in addition requires the
epistemic virtues, and it is clear from the text why she maintains this, since without the
operation of the virtues the agent would not be in a position to offer good grounds in favour
of her belief, as the case of the chicken sexer (who is clearly not exhibiting epistemic virtue)
illustrates.
What is important for our purposes, however, is that Zagzebski thinks that the
problem with the kind of ‘brute’ knowledge allowed by externalistsi.e., knowledge which
is not supported by good reflectively accessible groundsis that it is lucky. Indeed,
Zagzebski (1996, 39) complains that epistemic externalists are unduly “sanguine” about
epistemic luck.
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There’s clearly something right about this thought, but it won’t do as it stands. After
all, as we have seen, Greco (and he’s not alone on this score) is very much concerned to
eliminate epistemic luckindeed, this is an explicit motivation that he offers for advancing
virtue epistemology. Moreover, the type of epistemic luck at issue here clearly isn’t of the
veritic formit is not the type of epistemic luck that is at issue in Gettier-style case, for
example. Given that the chicken-sexer really does have this reliable chicken-sexing faculty,
then she doesn’t just happen to form true beliefs about the target propositionsin relevant
near-by possible worlds where she continues to form the beliefs that she forms in the actual
world, her beliefs will continue to be true.
My contention about internalist virtue epistemological theses, like that offered by
Zagzebski, was that they are concerned to eliminate not just veritic luck, but also a second
type of epistemic luck, what I termed “reflective” luck. In essence, reflective luck is like
veritic luck except that the ordering of worlds is not fixed in the usual ‘objective’ way by the
facts in the actual world, but is rather fixed in a ‘subjective’ way in line with what the agent
has good reason to believe the facts are in the actual world. That is, if an agent has good
reason to think that the actual world is such that, for example, she has a certain cognitive
ability, then she will retain this ability in most near-by worlds on this subjective ordering. In
contrast, if she has no good reason for thinking that she has this ability, then there will be no
tendency for near-by worlds to be such that she has this ability.17
It should be clear that while the chicken-sexer’s beliefs are not veritically lucky, they
are reflectively lucky, since her lack of good reflectively accessible grounds in favour of her
chicken-sexing beliefs will mean that there will be near-by possible worlds on the subjective
ordering in which she lacks her ability and so forms her belief on the same basis as in the
actual world and yet believes falsely.18 The advantage of this distinction is that it can explain
why someone like Zagzebski claims to be offering the real anti-luck epistemology, even
though agent reliabilists like Greco also explicitly offer an anti-luck motivation for the view.
In any case, this feature of Zagzebski’s position makes little difference to the central
claims of my argument against virtue epistemology. Even with this additional demand on
knowledge, it is still the case, as I showed above, that Zagzebski needs to appeal to a further
non-virtue theoretic condition on knowledge in order to deal with the Gettier cases, which
means that a strong virtue epistemological thesis is unsustainable even for her.
Moreover, the appeal to an anti-veritic luck condition in order to deal with Gettier
cases will undermine the anti-luck motivation for her view as a whole, even considered as a
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weak virtue epistemic thesis. After all, safety (or something like it), will deal with the veritic
luck, and insofar as reflective luck can be eliminated at all (the sceptic would claim otherwise
I think19), the most immediate way to eliminate it is by simply demanding good reflectively
accessible grounds on the part of the subject. But note that one can make that demand
without making any mention of virtue theory at all. For example, a reliable chicken sexer
who in addition also has good reflectively accessible reasons for believing what she does
could thereby form a true belief which is neither veritically nor reflectively lucky. Crucially,
however, this agent’s reflectively accessible grounds in support of her belief may in no way
connect up with her chicken-sexing ability. She may believe that she is reliable because that
is what she has been told by an otherwise reliable informant, for example, even though this
informant was in fact on this occasion trying (unsuccessfully as it happens) to deceive her.
From a virtue-theoretic point of view, the reflective support the agent has in support of her
belief would not be the product of virtue, but it would suffice to avoid the problem posed by
reflective luck. It seems then that, just as with agent reliabilism, the anti-luck motivation for
the view is not doing the job that it was meant to do.
With this outline of Zagzebski’s argumentand my treatment of itin mind we can
return to consider some more specific charges laid down by Axtell. In correspondence, Axtell
has usefully summarised his critical line in terms of the following two points. First, that I fail
to recognise that virtue epistemological views, like Zagzebski’s, are in a sense both
epistemically externalist and internalist. Second, that I fail to recognize that one could
advance both an anti-luck epistemology and a virtue epistemology. Neither point hits its
target, and it is important to recognise why.
The first misses its target because in the original paper (as in this paper) I explicitly
define the externalism and internalism as mutually excluding and exhaustive options, so there
is no compatibilist account available. Moreover, I motivate my drawing the distinction in this
way, and show that it corresponds to our standard way of understanding this contrast. Oddly,
Axtell doesn’t in either of his papers offer an alternative non-standard account of the
distinction, and neither does he explain how there could be a compatibilist view available in
terms of my account. Accordingly, it isn’t clear what to make of his objection. Note that I
wouldn’t deny that there can be a different ways of understanding the externalism/internalism
distinction such that some views end up occupying some sort of middle groundthe cake can
surely be sliced in more than one way (though some ways are better than others of course,
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and I would argue that my way of doing it is the right way to go). Nothing obviously follows
from this for my argument though.
The second point is similarly defective. My argument shows that the required anti-
luck condition that is needed to deal with Getter-style cases is not going to be such that it
must be understood in a virtue-theoretic fashion. Strong virtue epistemology is thus
unavailable. Moreover, if the non-virtue-theoretic anti-luck condition does the work that the
virtue-theoretic condition was supposed to do, as I claim, then merely combining the two
conditions in the manner of a weak virtue epistemology is not going to be a very satisfactory
option to take.
5. BECKER’S DEFENCE OF PROCESS RELIABILISM
There is, however, one line of response that has been made against my argumentdue to
Kelly Becker (forthcoming)that I do think might have some force, and I want to close by
considering this response here.
To begin with, we need to note that Becker’s target in his paper is not my attack on
virtue epistemology as such. He claims that my argument, if it works, will be just as effective
against a process reliabilist viewone that defines knowledge in terms of reliable
processesand it is reliabilism of this sort that he wishes to defend in the light of my
argument. Becker may be right that my argument has ramifications for process reliabilism as
well as virtue epistemology, especially if that view is understood strongly in line with a
strong reading of virtue epistemology such that knowledge is essentially and exclusively
defined in terms of reliable processes. After all, if my argument undermines the idea that we
must essentially appeal to epistemic virtues and cognitive faculties in our understanding of
knowledge by showing that an anti-luck epistemology would do just as well (and be better
motivated), then it would seem that this conclusion should ‘spill-over’ to impact on process
reliabilism too. In any case, it strikes me that Becker’s defence of process reliabilism may
highlight a way in which virtue epistemologists can begin defending their view.
Becker’s defence of process reliabilism turns on the observation that in order to get a
formulation of safety that works, it is essential that one indexes safety to the belief-forming
process actually employed. This is indeed how we formulated safety above, and we also saw
that this aspect of the view naturally followed from our formulation of luck which required
19
that the initial conditions for the event in question be fixed across the possible worlds under
consideration. Accordingly, when talking about a non-lucky (and thus safe) true belief, it is
important that one keeps the process that actually led to the formation of that belief fixed
across possible worlds as well.
It is worth noting what odd results one would get if one dropped this restriction on
safety. Consider the following example, adapted from one offered by Robert Nozick (1981,
179ff.). A grandmother has a highly reliable ability to tell when her grandson is well just by
getting a good look at him (in good light and so forth). On this basis, she forms a true belief
that he is well. There is a bug going around, however, which the grandson very nearly
succumbed to. Had he fallen ill his parents would have kept him away from his grandmother
and told her that he was fine. Furthermore, she would have believed them. Is the
grandmother’s belief safe?
According to the version of safety adopted here it is, since given that she has this
highly reliable ability to tell that her grandson is well, there won’t be any near-by possible
worlds where she forms the belief that he is well by this process and the belief is false.
Without the restriction to processes, however, safety will not yield this result, since
unrestricted it will follow that there is a wide class of near-by possible worlds where the
grandmother believes that her grandson is well when he isn’t (i.e., the ones where she forms
her belief about his health via the testimony of her grandson’s parents), and so her belief is
unsafe. Clearly, however, the grandmother does have a safe belief in this propositionand
has knowledge of it to, for that matterand so we should prefer the restricted version of
safety over an unrestricted version.
Now Becker’s thought is that if it is essential that we index safety to the process
through which the belief in question was formed, then we are in effect talking about the
safety of belief-forming processes here, rather than the safety of beliefs simpliciter. If that’s
right, though, suggests Becker, then isn’t safety really just a way of spelling out a form of
process reliabilism, rather than being an alternative to process reliabilism?
I think Becker is on to something here, and that the point he makes is not confined to
process reliabilism. (Indeed, this may be one way of fleshing-out Axtell’s complaint that I
wrongly oppose virtue epistemology and anti-luck epistemology). For just as the process
reliabilist could claim that safety is, properly understood, a modal characterisation of process
reliabilism, so too could the virtue epistemologist. Take reliabilism-based virtue
epistemology first. The line of thought that I am exploring would hold that a safety-based
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approach to knowledge which indexes safety to belief-forming processes is simply offering a
modal specification of the epistemic virtues and cognitive faculties that make up one’s
cognitive character. That is, that it is in the nature of one’s epistemic virtues and cognitive
faculties that they provide one with non-veritically lucky true beliefs in the propositions in
question.
The obvious objection that one might raise to this proposal is to argue that there can
be true beliefs that arise out of one’s good cognitive character which are not safe, and safe
true beliefs which do not arise out of one’s good cognitive character. Accordingly, since these
two notions come apart, safety cannot be plausibly thought to be a way of analysing
epistemic virtue.
I think there is a problem here, although I don’t think the problem facing this line is
quite as bad as one might have initially thought. For example, is it really so clear that a true
belief not formed via the cognitive traits that make up an agent’s good cognitive character
could nevertheless be safe?
One possibility that immediately springs to mind is that of a true belief that was
formed entirely on a whim. A true belief so formed, the idea goes, would not reflect one’s
good cognitive character, but could nevertheless be safe. On closer inspection, however, such
examples start to look suspect. Setting aside for a moment why we might think such a belief
could be a safe, is it really so clear that it is possible to form a belief on a whim? One can act
on a whim, for sure, but that is a very different matter. Remember that beliefs are not
occurent states, but dispositional in character, so the idea of a belief being formed seemingly
out of nothing in this way is deeply problematic. In any case, it is problematic enough for a
virtue epistemologist to dismiss such cases as bad psychology.
Dismissing the idea that beliefs can be formed on the basis of whims leads us to
consider whether we can make sense of the idea of there being stable belief-forming
processes which gives rise to safeand thus, presumably, reliabletrue beliefs but which
are not part of that agent’s cognitive character? By agent reliabilist lights, at least, I don’t see
how such a distinction could be motivated. As Greco (2003, 356-7) concedes, even the belief-
forming process that Alvin Plantinga (1993, 199) describes (which concerns a brain lesion
which reliably gives rise to true beliefs) could count as part of one’s good cognitive character
if the belief-forming trait in question was a stable enough feature of the agent’s cognitive
character.
Of course, that’s not to deny that there may be those virtue epistemologists, like
Zagzebski, who think that there can be stable belief-forming traits on the part of the agent
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which do not form part of that agent’s cognitive character by her lights. Indeed, even setting
the brain lesion possibility to one side, we have already seen an example in this respect: that
of the chicken-sexing belief-forming process employed by the chicken-sexer. As we noted
above, the mere successful operation of a reliable cognitive trait will not suffice for
knowledge by Zagzebski’s lights, since it is essential that the agent also employs her
epistemic virtues, more narrowly conceived, and thus has reflectively accessible grounds in
favour of her beliefs.
Nevertheless, when it comes to internalist virtue epistemological theories like that
offered by Zagzebski, the right question to ask is not whether there can be safe true beliefs
which arise as a result of stable cognitive traits on the part of the agent but which do not arise
out of the agent’s good cognitive character. Instead, the question is rather whether there can
be safe true beliefs that meet this description which are not only safe in the sense of not being
veritically lucky, but also safe in the sense of not being reflectively lucky either, since only in
this way will we capture the internalism inherent in the view. With the question so posed,
however, it is no more plausible to think that safety and good cognitive character come apart
on this construal of safety and good cognitive character than it does on the construal of these
notions that is in play when we consider reliabilism-based versions of virtue epistemology.
Nevertheless, while the foregoing remarks indicate that there is no obvious problem
with this direction of fit between safe true belief and true belief that arises out of good
cognitive character, the opposing direction of fit does pose a problem. In particular, it does
seem that there are cases where an agent forms a true belief as a result of her good cognitive
character, and yet the belief so formed is not safe.
As we noted above, virtue epistemology faces the problemkey to my critique of the
viewthat it is unable to deal with the Getter cases, and these cases precisely fit the bill in
this respect. Think again of Mary’s true belief that her husband is in the room, formed out of
epistemic virtue and yet Gettierized. Or Barny’s true belief that he is looking at barn. In both
cases we have a clear example of a true belief that is formed as a result of good cognitive
character, and yet which is unsafe.
The prospects for applying Becker’s proposal to virtue epistemology thus hinge on
whether virtue epistemologists are able to offer the response to the Gettier problem that they
claim to be able to offer. I’m sceptical on this score as I have indicated above, but at least it is
now clear, I take it, just how much weight the virtue epistemologist’s response to the Gettier
problem carries, since it is only with an answer to this problem in hand that it can adequately
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evade my argument against it. In essence, the crux of the matter is that it is only by offering
an adequate resolution to the Gettier problem that the virtue epistemologist can hope to
reconcile the apparently conflicting demands imposed by virtue epistemology and our anti-
luck intuitions about knowledge.20
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NOTES
1  For two other examples of commentators who use epistemic luck to motivate their virtue epistemology, see
Zagzebski (1996, passim) and Axtell (2001).
2  Very roughly, one could class Sosa (1991) and Plantinga (1993) as offering agent reliabilist theses, though I
don’t doubt that they would resist this characterisation of their views (Plantinga in particular).
3  This is not an example that Greco (1999) offers, but it is structurally similar to the evil demon case that he
describes (see 286). I have chosen to use this example solely because it has the advantage of not appealing to
anything as metaphysically extravagant as an evil demon to make the required point.
4  Zagzebski was actually directing this example against Plantinga’s (1993) related ‘proper functionalism’
theory, although the differences between proper functionalism and agent reliabilism are not important in this
regard. Indeed, Greco (2000, 251) himself discusses this example and notes that it is just as much a problem for
his view as for Plantinga’s.
5  Note that the worlds are here being ordered in the usual way in terms of their similarity to the actual world.
For more on this account of luck (including what needs to be added in order to deal with some problem cases),
and its application to epistemology, see Pritchard (2005a, part two). For some of the key critiques of my account
of luck, see Lackey (2006), Coffman (forthcoming), and Riggs (forthcoming).
6  For obvious reasons, this account will only apply to beliefs in contingent propositions. In order to keep
matters as simple as possible, in what follows I will take it as given that the target proposition is always fully
contingent (i.e., not necessary in any sense, whether nomological, physical, metaphysical, etc.,).
7  Notice that it is essential that Greco’s second point is allied with the first if it is to do any major work
undermining my argument, since without it his response will only at best weaken that part of my argument
which is directed at whether weak virtue epistemology is adequately motivated. After all, the correctness of this
second point leaves my claim that strong virtue epistemology is false completely untouched.
8  For more on this intermediate conception of safety, see Pritchard (2006; forthcoming).
9  Notice that I’m not suggesting here that cognitive character needs to be understood in such a way that it is
completely independent of all environmental factors (indeed, I think this is false). The point is rather that the
changes in the environment that we encounter as we move from the example of Mary to that of Mary* seem to
have no impact at all on either agent’s cognitive character.
10  Interestingly, there have been some commentators who have been willing to argue that Barny does possess
knowledge, even despite the fact that his belief could so easily have been false. See, for example, Hetherington
(1998).
11  Greco has indicated to me in conversation that this is indeed the line that he takes on these cases.
12  Sensitivity is the main modal condition imposed on knowledge by Nozick (1981, chapter 3).
13  That said, safety is in fact much more effective at eliminating epistemic luck more generally. Moreover, it is
also better motivated and not subject to the same kinds of problems. For more discussion of the relative merits
of safety and sensitivity, see Pritchard (2005a, §6.3).
14  Interestingly, in her discussion of this ‘because of’ clause, Zagzebski (1999, §5.B) explicitly grants that a
natural gloss of what this condition demands can be captured by the sensitivity condition, and that this is
probably the best account available of this condition. She goes on to argue, however, that, strictly speaking, the
gloss cannot be right. The reason she gives for this is that such counterfactual analyses cannot capture other uses
of the ‘because of’ clause, such as the claim that X is a bachelor because X is unmarried. The reason the analysis
doesn’t work in this case, however, is clearly that there are no relevant counterfactuals. The failure of the
analysis in this case therefore has no obvious implications for uses of the clause in cases where there are
counterfactuals, as in the cases that we are interested here where we are trying to offer an analysis of knowledge
of contingent propositions.
15  A third response to my argument that takes this general line can be found in Umbers (2005), but since this is
an unpublished manuscript, I won’t comment on the specifics of this paper here.
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16  Note that, confusingly, Zagzebski often refers to her view as a form of epistemic externalism, on the grounds
that epistemic virtues as she understands them are of their nature reliable. That is, Zagzebski treats internalist
views as being those positions which deny that there are any external epistemic conditions on knowledge, with
externalist views demanding such conditions (perhaps in conjunction with an internal epistemic condition, like a
justification condition, internalistically conceived). While Zagzebski’s view is no doubt more ‘externalist’ than
an extreme form of epistemic internalism which held that knowledge was simply true beliefs backed up by good
reflectively accessible grounds, it is still an internalist thesis by the lights of the way that I draw this distinction
here (which is, I would argue, a standard way of drawing this distinction, though see Conee & Feldman (2001)
for a different view, albeit one that is still in conflict with Zagzebski’s account of the distinction). In any case,
notice that the way Zagzebski draws the internalist/externalist distinction is such that hardly anyone in the
literature endorses internalism (at least post-Gettier), since hardly anyone thinks that true belief that meets an
internal epistemic condition will suffice for knowledge. Since the distinction doesn’t capture the one side of the
debate, it doesn’t capture the debate.
17  For more on this distinction, see Pritchard (2005a, part two; 2005b).
18  Notice that one also needs to individuate the process in which the belief was formed differently on the
objective and subjective orderings. In the case of the former, one individuates it in the usual way in terms of the
actual belief-forming process used, while in the case of the latter one needs to individuate it in terms of the
process that the agent thinks was used. For more discussion of this point, see Pritchard (2005a, chapter 6).
19  I relate reflective luck to the sceptical problem in Pritchard (2005a, chapters 8-9; 2005b). In what follows, I
set the sceptical problem about whether reflective luck is eliminable to one side.
20  Thanks to Guy Axtell, Kelly Becker, John Greco, and Richard Umbers. An earlier version of this paper was
given as part of an invited symposium at the 2006 Pacific APA in Portland, Oregon. Thanks to my
commentatorJim Montmarquetto the other participants in this sessionRobert Roberts and Jay Woodto
the chairAbrol Fairweatherand to the organiserHeather Battaly. Finally, thanks also to the audience,
especially Jason Baehr, Mylan Engal, Richard Greene, and Ken Lucey. Research into this area was supported by
an AHRC research leave award.
